Hacks


Inside the Targeted Attack on The New York Times

The Chinese group behind the targeted attack on the New York Times was laser focused on accessing the email of a reporter and the newspaper’s former Beijing bureau chief to the point that it used an inordinate number of custom malware samples to get the job done.“In terms of statistics, 45 [custom malware samples] as a ratio to the number of computers involved, 53, is a high ratio,” said Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer of Mandiant, the forensics firm hired by the Times to investigate the targeted attack. “Usually, you’ll see one or two for the relatively small number of systems involved.”

China, The New York Times and the Value of Self-Shaming

There aren’t many things that count as surprises anymore in the security industry. And the news today that The New York Times was penetrated by a team of Chinese attackers who apparently had access to large amounts of employee emails for several months certainly doesn’t fall into that category. It would be news if these attackers weren’t targeting The Times and other large media companies. What’s interesting and novel is that the company decided to out itself as a victim, signing up for what may be a large dose of public scorn and derisive laughter.

Experts Say CEOs Need to Get Handle on Cyberespionage Problem

NEW YORK–The long list of high-profile cyberespionage and cybercrime attacks that have surfaced in the last couple of years has led to broad discussions in the security community, government circles and elsewhere about the scope of the problem. Those discussions now are just starting to reach into the boardroom, and security experts say that any CEO who isn’t concerned about this problem is living in the past.


Outcomes in security tend to be about data loss; stolen pharmaceutical formulas, jet fighter blueprints, patient records, credit card numbers etc. All of these come with a great cost to the victim and make for sexy headlines. But far too little is dissected and analyzed about service disruptions.

Back in the dark days of dial-up connectivity, attackers wouldn’t bother compromising home computers as bots to be used in distributed denial-of-service. The lack of bandwidth made PCs persona non grata in the DDoS world. Instead, attackers targeted Web servers, the only machines with the high-speed broadband connections to make DDoS viable.In the years since, broadband has literally come home and personal machines have been compromised by the millions for everything from spam to flood attacks against websites and online services.

While every corporate general counsel, CIO and anyone with a CISSP will tell you that hacking back against adversaries is illegal and generally a bad thing to do, there are alternatives that companies can use to gain insight into who is behind attacks, collect forensic evidence and generally confound hackers, perhaps to the point where they veer away from your network.

Rarely a day goes by without mention of a targeted attack against some government-related website, massive disruptions in online banking services, or critical vulnerabilities in specialized software running our power plants and water supplies. And all the while, IT and security organizations have thought little about fighting back. Their options were limited to better patching, more security hardware and new firewall rules. That dynamic is changing because the buzzwords active defense and hacking back are creeping into conversations between vendors and customers, IT managers and executives, executives and legal teams. 

A Canadian college student was expelled after reporting a vulnerability in the school’s Web site that potentially exposed private data on more than 250,000 students.The high-achieving computer science major, Hamed Al-Khabaz and another student, Ovidiu Mija, in November were developing a mobile app using Omnivox Web portal software when they discovered “sloppy coding” that could lead to a major data breach. Ominvox is used at hundreds of Canadian campuses, including theirs at Montreal’s Dawson College.

It appears that the attackers behind the Red October cyberespionage campaign are taking their ball and going home. Since the attack came to light on Monday, the attackers have begun shutting down their infrastructure and the hosting providers and registrars involved with some of the command-and-control domains are shutting those down, as well.