Researchers: LinkedIn, Instagram Vulnerable to Preview-Link RCE Security Woes

preview link security

Popular chat apps, including LINE, Slack, Twitter DMs and others, can also leak location data and share private info with third-party servers.


Link previews in popular chat apps on iOS and Android are a firehose of security and privacy issues, researchers have found. At risk are Facebook Messenger, LINE, Slack, Twitter Direct Messages, Zoom and many others. In the case of Instagram and LinkedIn, it’s even possible to execute remote code on the companies’ servers through the feature, according to an analysis.

Link previews are standard in most chat apps, and they can be very useful. When a user sends a link through, it renders a short summary and a preview image in-line in the chat, so other users don’t have to click the link to see what it points to.

Unfortunately, there’s a downside. According to independent researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk, the feature can leak IP addresses, expose links sent in end-to-end encrypted chats and has been caught “unnecessarily downloading gigabytes of data quietly in the background.”

The issues go back to how the previews are generated, according to the researchers. There are three ways to do that: The sender can generate it; the receiver can generate it; or the server can generate it. The last two are problematic, with the server-generated version being the most concerning.

“How does the app know what to show in the summary?” Bakry and Mysk explained. “It must somehow automatically open the link to know what’s inside. But is that safe? What if the link contains malware? Or what if the link leads to a very large file that you wouldn’t want the app to download and use up your data.”

Sender-Generated Links

If the sender generates the preview, the app will go and download what’s in the link, create a summary and a preview image of the website, and it will send this as an attachment along with the link.

A typical link preview. Source: Google.

“When the app on the receiving end gets the message, it’ll show the preview as it got from the sender without having to open the link at all,” explained the researchers, in a posting this week. “This way, the receiver would be protected from risk if the link is malicious.”

iMessage, Signal (if the link preview option is turned on in settings), Viber and WhatsApp all follow this best-practice approach, they noted. But, there is a caveat when it comes to Viber.

“If you send a link to a large file, your phone will automatically try to download the whole file even if it’s several gigabytes in size,” researchers noted.

They added, “it’s also worth mentioning that even though Viber chats are end-to-end encrypted, tapping on a link will cause the app to forward that link to Viber servers for the purposes of fraud protection and personalized ads.”

Receiver-Generated Links

When the receiver generates the preview, it means that the app will open any link that’s sent to it, automatically, with no user interaction needed.

“This one is bad,” said the researchers, noting that the process can leak location data.

“Let’s briefly explain what happens when an app opens a link,” they wrote. “First, the app has to connect to the server that the link leads to and ask it for what’s in the link. This is referred to as a GET request. In order for the server to know where to send back the data, the app includes your phone’s IP address in the GET request.”

They added, “If you’re using an app that follows this approach, all an attacker would have to do is send you a link to their own server where it can record your IP address. Your app will happily open the link even without you tapping on it, and now the attacker will know where you are [down to a city block].”

A second issue is that a link could potentially point to a large video or archive file.

“A buggy app might try to download the whole file, even if it’s gigabytes in size, causing it to use up your phone’s battery and data plan,” the researchers warned.

Server-Generated Links

Finally, in the third approach, the app sends the link to an external server and asks it to generate a preview, then the server will send the preview back to both the sender and receiver.

While this avoids the IP address-leaking issue found in the receiver-generating scenario, it potentially exposes information to third parties, according to the researchers, and can allow for code execution if the link points to a malicious website with JavaScript.

As far as data exposure, the server will need to make a copy (or at least a partial copy) of what’s in the link to generate the preview.

“Say you were sending a private Dropbox link to someone, and you don’t want anyone else to see what’s in it,” researchers wrote. “The question becomes…are the servers downloading entire files, or only a small amount to show the preview? If they’re downloading entire files, do the servers keep a copy, and if so for how long? And are these copies stored securely, or can the people who run the servers access the copies?”

Multiple apps use this approach for previewing links. But in testing, they vary widely in terms of how much data the servers downloaded, researchers said:

  • Discord: Downloads up to 15 MB of any kind of file.
  • Facebook Messenger: Downloads entire files if it’s a picture or a video, even files gigabytes in size.
  • Google Hangouts: Downloads up to 20 MB of any kind of file.
  • Instagram: Just like Facebook Messenger, but not limited to any kind of file. The servers will download anything no matter the size.
  • LINE: Downloads up to 20 MB of any kind of file.
  • LinkedIn: Downloads up to 50 MB of any kind of file.
  • Slack: Downloads up to 50 MB of any kind of file.
  • Twitter: Downloads up to 25 MB of any kind of file.
  • Zoom: Downloads up to 30 MB of any kind of file.

“Though most of the app servers we’ve tested put a limit on how much data gets downloaded, even a 15 MB limit still covers most files that would typically be shared through a link (most pictures and documents don’t exceed a few MBs in size),” the researchers noted. “So if these servers do keep copies, it would be a privacy nightmare if there’s ever a data breach of these servers.”

The issue is of particular concern to LINE users, according to Bakry and Mysk, because LINE claims to have end-to-end encryption where only the sender and receiver can read the messages.

“When the LINE app opens an encrypted message and finds a link, it sends that link to a LINE server to generate the preview,” according to the researchers. “We believe that this defeats the purpose of end-to-end encryption, since LINE servers know all about the links that are being sent through the app, and who’s sharing which links to whom. Basically, if you’re building an end-to-end encrypted app, please don’t follow [the server-generated] approach.”

After the researchers sent a report to the LINE security team, the company updated its FAQ to include a disclosure that they use external servers for preview links, along with information on how to disable them.

Facebook Messenger and its sister app Instagram Direct Messages are the only ones in the testing that put no limit on how much data is downloaded to generate a link preview. Facebook responded to the researchers’ concerns, saying that it considers the feature to be working as intended, but did not confirm how long it holds onto the data. Twitter gave the same response.

“As we explained to the researcher weeks ago, these are not security vulnerabilities,” a facebook company spokesperson told Threatpost. “The behavior described is how we show previews of a link on Messenger or how people can share a link on Instagram, and we don’t store that data. This is consistent with our data policy and terms of service.”

Slack meanwhile confirmed that it only caches link previews for around 30 minutes, which is also explained in its documentation.

Zoom told the researchers that it is looking into the issue and that it’s discussing ways to ensure user privacy.

The researchers also contacted Discord, Google Hangouts and LinkedIn to report their findings, but said they have not received a response from these two.

Remote Code-Execution Woes

As far as the code-execution issue, the researchers posted a video with a proof-of-concept of how hackers can run any JavaScript code on Instagram servers. And in LinkedIn Messages case, the servers were also vulnerable to running JavaScript code, which allowed them to bypass the 50 MB download limit in a test.

“You can’t trust code that may be found in all the random links that get shared in chats,” Bakry and Mysk explained. “We did find, however, at least two major apps that did this: Instagram and LinkedIn. We tested this by sending a link to a website on our server which contained JavaScript code that simply made a callback to our server. We were able to confirm that we had at least 20 seconds of execution time on these servers. It may not sound like much, and our code didn’t really do anything bad, but hackers can be creative.”

When reached via Twitter DM, Mysk told Threatpost that “In our testing, an attacker can run any JavaScript code on these servers. While it may not be immediately obvious how this can cause real harm, allowing JavaScript code to run leaves the door wide open for a team of dedicated attackers. The simplest attack would be something like mining cryptocurrencies on these servers and using up their resources.”

Neither company responded to the researchers’ concerns. But the Facebook spokesperson told Threatpost that the feature works as intended, and that it’s not a security vulnerability. The person added that way the functionality is presented does not take into account industry-standard security measures that Instagram has put in place to protect against code-execution risks, and that when the concern was reported, it “found no risk of RCE.”

As for LinkedIn, a spokesperson told Threatpost via email: “To help keep our members safe, we use a sandbox environment to evaluate the security risk of the links being shared. These environments are ephemeral and have strict access controls that are designed to discover malicious code execution. To this end, we do execute JavaScript in the URL contents for completeness of evaluation. We also don’t cache the content of these URLs. All these steps are taken to inspect content of link for safety.”

But Mysk noted that such protections may not be good enough.

“Server-side mitigations such as running JavaScript code in a sandbox environment is effective in thwarting most attacks, but more sophisticated attacks could allow the attacker to leave the sandbox and execute code outside the protected environment, which could potentially allow the attacker to steal data and secret keys,” he told Threatpost. “We’ve seen many successful attempts to escape the JavaScript sandbox in apps like Chrome, and these link preview servers are no different.”

Looking for Safety

The link-preview issue is just one more concern when it comes to the security of the collaboration apps that have become intrinsic to the work-from-home reality caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The good news is that some apps don’t render previews at all, such as Signal (if the link preview option is turned off in settings), Threema, TikTok and WeChat.

“This is the safest way to handle links, since the app won’t do anything with the link unless you specifically tap on it,” researchers noted.

However, they also warned that link previews are a widespread phenomenon: “There are many email apps, business apps, dating apps, games with built-in chat, and other kinds of apps that could be generating link previews improperly, and may be vulnerable to some of the problems we’ve covered.”

This post was updated on Oct. 27 at 2:30 p.m. to include more details on the RCE findings as well as a statement from Instagram via a Facebook spokesperson; and at 4 p.m. to include a statement from LinkedIn.


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