Researcher Releases 'Qubes' Hardened OS
Joanna Rutkowska, a security researcher known for her work on virtualization security and low-level rootkits, has released a new open-source operating system meant to provide isolation of the OS's components for better security.
The OS, called Qubes, is based on Xen, X and Linux and is in a basic, alpha stage right now. Qubes relies on virtualization to separate applications running on the OS and also places many of the system-level components in sandboxes to prevent them from affecting each other.
Qubes implements Security by Isolation approach. To do this, Qubes utilizes virtualization technology, to be able to isolate various programs from each other, and even sandbox many system-level components, like networking or storage subsystem, so that their compromise don’t affect the integrity of the rest of the system.
Qubes lets the user define many security domains implemented as lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs), or “AppVMs”. E.g. user can have “personal”, “work”, “shopping”, “bank”, and “random” AppVMs and can use the applications from within those VMs just like if they were executing on the local machine, but at the same time they are well isolated from each other. Qubes supports secure copy-and-paste and file sharing between the AppVMs, of course.
Recommended Reads
The concepts of isolation and sandboxing have been around for decades, and are used in a number of applications, including hardened operating systems and some security products. And many security experts say that sandboxing is one of the more effective ways of preventing malicious code from affecting entire systems, rather than just one vulnerable application.
In a guest column in January on Threatpost, security researcher Dino Dai Zovi said that he expected more and more vendors to implement sandboxing and isolation in the coming year.
"The desktop analogue to the network firewall is the privilege separated and sandboxed application. These mechanisms finally move the bull (untrusted data) from the china shop (your data) to the outside where it belongs (a sandbox). While it doesn't quite reduce the attack surface, it significantly raises the bar for an attacker through defense-in-depth. If an attacker is able to exploit a vulnerability and execute code, they must then exploit another vulnerability in the sandboxing mechanism in order to break free and even read the user's data," he wrote.
Rutkowska said that she plans to release the full version of Qubes by the end of 2010, and that she may create some commercial extensions to the OS in the future.
Kaspersky Lab Channel and Alliance Partners
Newsletter Sign-up
Newsletter Sign-up
Security news and analysis with expert opinion and perspective from the Threatpost editors.
Take Our Poll
Listen to Latest Podcasts
-
-
You are missing some Flash content that should appear here! Perhaps your browser cannot display it, or maybe it did not initialize correctly.
-
You are missing some Flash content that should appear here! Perhaps your browser cannot display it, or maybe it did not initialize correctly.


Comments
Xerobank has been working on a Virtualized Browser for a few months now. This also sounds very exciting! Looking forward to it!
Cool this chick is both smart and sexy. Cant wait to see how this OS develops!
So what's the next step? If your running app is in a container, why not move/migrate it to an other running os? Take a snapshot and roll back if needed, pause an app so it don't use cpu anymore while it's not needed... what you can do actually with a VM is what you can expect to have for a virtualized application. Maybe that is the future of computing?
This is actually a waste of time. Everyone keeps doing redundant work. Green Hills INTEGRITY Padded Cell and LynuxWorks LynxSecure solved this problem commercially, with OKL4/seL4, Nizza Architecture, Perseus Architecture, and Nova microhypervisor doing it open source and free/semi-free. The L4 and commercial groups have a well-validated microkernel, needed base services/drivers, a POSIX/Linux/other VM for legacy apps, and frameworks to integrate isolated apps with regular apps. We could build a trusted workstation, router, VPN, etc. if we started there. And now, instead of progress in one of these directions, we have (sighs) *another* OS acting as a hypervisor/MILS/security kernel. We don't need it. We already have a good start with the other systems. Now, we need to work below (trusted hardware/firmware) and above (drivers/libraries/coreservices).
I'd be overjoyed to see the lovely Joanna use her extensive hardware experience to actually create trustworthy hardware. Particularly, an open-source processor and firmware that's i686 compatible with MMX, SSE, Intel VT, IOMMU, and trusted boot capabilities that was produced using the strongest defect reduction techniques & verified to have no errors in security-relevant functionality. Examples moving in that direction are AAMP7 and VAMP. With this, we can use existing assured kernels, hypervisors, frameworks, etc. to build usable, secure systems. We need the hardware gurus like Joanna to do their part first, though, because we will otherwise be building stone fortresses on muddy foundations.
Post new comment